Idealistic Studies 24 (2):111-122 (1994)

Steven Barbone
San Diego State University
The claim that we have free will is so important to Kant that many of his commentators suggest that the entire structure and machinery of his Critique of Pure Reason is constructed solely for the purpose of sheltering free will from the devastating effects it suffers from empiricism. Indeed, Kant himself, in a famous line in the preface, tells us, “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” [Bxxx]. The question of whether people are free willed or determined in their actions is the central issue of the Third Antinomy, and perhaps arguably, the main issue of the whole Critique.
Keywords Continental Philosophy  History of Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0046-8541
DOI 10.5840/idstudies199424214
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