Matador (2010)

Authors
Abstract
The topic of this book is the thinking in which we engage when we reflectively decide what to do, and when we reflectively reach conclusions as to the correct answers to questions. The main objective is to identify a way of looking at ourselves and at our deliberations that is adequate to our lives. It must accommodate both our conception of ourselves as free, rational and self-directed subjects, and our feeling that we deliberate freely. It must also identify a place for us that will feel like home, doing justice to our status as subjects, within the world as we relate to it when we practise the natural sciences. The central claims are not about how we are, but about how we should look at ourselves. A key task is to show that this limited ambition, which is forced on us by the need to avoid metaphysical implausibility, nonetheless allows us to develop a position that has sufficient strength to do its work. The aim is to show something that is all too easily taken for granted. This is that we can limit ourselves to a strictly naturalistic ontology, while still having access to a generous idiom that allows us to speak of ourselves as free in the exercise of our rationality.
Keywords Mind  Freedom  Agency  Causation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $5.06 new (86% off)   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 184876250X   9781848762503
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

View all 85 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Allison on Rational Agency.Stephen Engstrom - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):405 – 418.
New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation.Uwe Meixner - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):17-38.
Freedom, Resistance, Agency.Manuel Dries - 2015 - In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford University Press. pp. 142–162.
Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency.Xiangdong Xu - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):369-389.
The Unclear, the Inconsequential, and Aristotelian Agency.Michael J. White - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):509-518.
Bio-Agency and the Problem of Action.J. C. Skewes & C. A. Hooker - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (3):283 - 300.
Emotional Reason How to Deliberate About Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):1-22.
Free Agency and Materialism.J. A. Cover & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 47-72.
Kant's Theory of Freedom.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - In Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy. Cornell University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-08

Total views
45 ( #235,751 of 2,444,894 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #311,040 of 2,444,894 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes