David Hume as a Social Theorist

Utilitas 22 (4):369-392 (2010)

Abstract
This article examines Russell Hardin's interpretation of Hume's argument that great social order depends on coordination convention. The main argument shows that despite an apparent move in that direction Hume's main argument is that justice and the other convention-based virtues rest on a cooperative convention which solves a prisoner's dilemma problem and that states are required when a society exceeds some small size because only states can solve the large number prisoner's dilemma problems that constitute the 'problem of social order'. In this Hume's argument is indebted to the original form of this argument found in Hobbes's Leviathan
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820810000300
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1651 - Harmondsworth, Penguin.

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Hume and Mutual Advantage.J. Salter - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (3):302-321.

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