First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism

Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71 (2009)

Authors
Dorit Bar-On
University of Connecticut
Abstract
What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for being dissatisfied with materialist introspectionism as a way out of the dilemma. In section 3, “Constitutivism”, I outline two constitutivist alternatives to materialist introspectionism. In section 4, “A Neo-Expressivist View”, I offer my neo-expressivist view (defended in Bar-On, Speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004 ), according to which the distinctive status of mental self-ascriptions is to be explained by appeal to the expressive character of acts of issuing them (in speech or in thought). This view, I argue, allows us to stay clear of eliminativism without committing to Cartesian substance dualism, thereby offering a viable way of slipping between the horns of Rorty’s dilemma.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-009-9173-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,128
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Self-Expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Expressing First-Person Authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.
Transparency, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):134-152.
Neo-Expressivism: (Self-)Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth.Dorit Bar-On - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:11-34.
First-Person Privilege, Judgment, and Avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rules of Language and First Person Authority.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.
On the Normative Authority of Others.Yonatan Shemmer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):517-521.
Descartes and First Person Authority.Steven L. Reynolds - 1992 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2):181-189.
The Presidential Address: On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:1-19.
Socratic Authority.Raphael Woolf - 2008 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (1):1-38.
A Defense of Epistemic Authority.Linda Zagzebski - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):293-306.
Habituation and First-Person Authority.Jonathan Webber - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge.
First-Person Privilege, Judgment, and Avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.
Varieties of Expressivism.James Sias Dorit Bar‐on - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-05-02

Total views
107 ( #83,348 of 2,311,559 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #517,694 of 2,311,559 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature