Journal of Semantics 14 (4):319-348 (1997)

Bart Geurts
Radboud University Nijmegen
This is an attempt at reviving Kneale's version of the description theory of names, which says that a proper name is synonymous with a definite description of the form ‘the individual named so-and-so’. To begin with, I adduce a wide range of observations to show that names and overt definites are alike in all relevant respects. I then turn to Kripke's main objection against Kneale's proposal, and endeavour to refute it. In the remainder of the paper I elaborate on Kneale's analysis, adopting a theory of presupposition proposed by van der Sandt.
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DOI 10.1093/jos/14.4.319
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References found in this work BETA

Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 255-296.
Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul Kripke - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):255-276.
Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.
Intentional Identity.P. T. Geach - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.

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Citations of this work BETA

Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
Against Arguments From Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.
Type-Ambiguous Names.Anders J. Schoubye - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):715-767.

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