Journal of Philosophy 119 (2):57-88 (2022)

Authors
David James Barnett
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.
Keywords ratifiable  decision theory  Newcomb  Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives  cyclic preferences  decision instability  causal decision theory  evidential decision theory  Psychopath Button  Semi-Frustrater
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DOI 10.5840/jphil202211925
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