Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):154-155 (2003)
One reason why humans don't behave according to standard game theoretical rationality is because it's not realistic to assume that everyone else is behaving rationally. An individual is expected to have psychological mechanisms that function to maximize his/her long-term payoffs in a world of potentially “irrational” individuals. Psychological decision theory has to be individualistic because individuals make decisions, not groups.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Moral Desirability and Rational Decision.Christoph Lumer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):561-584.
Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Paul Weirich - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):560-582.
Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing?Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.
Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends.Robert Bass - manuscript
Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW]Hans Lottenbach - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.
What Makes a Good Decision? Robust Satisficing as a Normative Standard of Rational Decision Making.Barry Schwartz, Yakov Ben-Haim & Cliff Dacso - 2011 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (2):209-227.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #181,046 of 2,158,934 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #353,777 of 2,158,934 )
How can I increase my downloads?