Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):319-324 (2010)
Classical thinking on rationality regards it as an all-or-nothing affair. It thus fails to account for the fact that institutions are powerful social factors that frame the contexts within which rational agents supposedly exercise their ability to choose. This poses the classic dilemma: should social explanation refer to individual decisions or to institutions? Wettersten skillfully criticizes some of the most advanced solutions to it, and attempts to formulate a better explanatory unit for the social sciences: the partially rational individual. Since the partially rational individual is also only partially an individual,Wettersten's methodological reconciliation between individualism and holism seems to have some ontological implications too, ones that he seems reluctant to embrace. His book is nevertheless an interesting contribution to the controversy regarding the limits to the explanatory power of social theories
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
“Collective and Individual Rationality: Maynard Keynes's Methodological Standpoint and Policy Prescription”.Andy Denis - manuscript
Recent Work on Individualism in the Social, Behavioural, and Biological Sciences.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):397-423.
Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency.Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese - 2009 - Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
The Limits of Individualism Are Not the Limits of Rationality.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):164-165.
Added to index2010-05-15
Total downloads32 ( #158,718 of 2,158,934 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #353,777 of 2,158,934 )
How can I increase my downloads?