Intentionality and belief de re: A critical study of Searle's representative internalism

Erkenntnis 41 (1):65-85 (1994)
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Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Indexicality  Intentionality  Language  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128911
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Subject, Thought, And Context.Philip Pettit (ed.) - 1986 - NY: Clarendon Press.
Belief de Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.
Other Bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.

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Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.

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