Is category specificity in the world or in the mind?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):478-479 (2001)
HIT produces category-specific deficits without category- specific mechanisms by assuming that differences in properties of objects are transparently converted into differences in representational format. A complete model would specify the mechanisms that accomplish this. Such category-specific mechanisms may have evolved because assumptions about the properties of some kinds of objects (e.g., living things) are invalid for others (e.g., artifacts).
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X0124415X
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Koen Lamberts (2001). Category-Specific Deficits and Exemplar Models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):484-485.

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