Erkenntnis 17 (3):273 - 290 (1982)

The concepts of supportive evidence and of relevant evidence seem very closely related to each other. Supportive evidence is clearly always relevant as well. But must relevant evidence be defined as evidence which is either supportive or weakeking? In an explicit or implicit manner, this is indeed the position of many philosophers. The paradox of ideal evidence, however, shows us that this is to restrictive. Besides increasing or decreasing the probability attached to some hypothesis, evidence can alter or interact with the background assumptions underlying the hypothesis.In most circumstances, the (post hoc) relevance of evidence can indeed be judged by its effect on the confidence one attaches to hypotheses. Occasionally, as in the circumstances described by Example I, and more generally called “the Paradox of Ideal Evidence”, the relevance of evidence to an hypothesis can only be understood by appeal to a broader sense
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DOI 10.1007/BF00182670
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References found in this work BETA

Higher Order Degrees of Belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.
Concepts of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 1978 - Mind 87 (345):22-45.

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