Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):1-23 (2005)
Opponents of inference to the best explanation often raise the objection that theories that give us the best explanation of some phenomena need not be the most probable ones. And they are certainly right. But what can we conclude from this insight? Should we ban abduction from theory choice and work instead, for example, with a Bayesian approach? This would be a mistake brought about by a certain misapprehension of the epistemological task. We have to think about the real aims of epistemology and scientific practice in order to see that we are not primarily interested in the most probable theories but in explanatory ones leading to a coherent model of our world.
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