Abstract

In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between two types of empirical judgments, judgments of experience and judgments of perception. This distinction has puzzled commentators because it is unclear whether the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason allows for judgments of perception. To begin, I show that the troublesome aspects of judgments of perception cannot be explained away without addressing the argument of the Deduction. Next, I analyze the 1781 and the 1787 versions of the Deduction, showing Kant's primary philosophical motivation for revising the earlier edition. Finally, I present a detailed interpretation of the Prolegomena's judgments of perception. After giving a sympathetic defense of Kant's examples, I show that many of his central claims about judgments of perception indeed conflict with both versions of the Deduction. However, I also show how the development of the Deduction from 1781 to 1787 accounts for why Kant makes his most troublesome claims about judgments of perception.