More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character

Mind 128 (512):1013-1044 (2019)

Authors
Luca Barlassina
University of Sheffield
Max Khan Hayward
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content, while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content : More of P!Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!
Keywords Affect  Imperativism  Intentionalism  Emotion  Pain  Pleasure  Phenomenology  Phenomenal character  Valence  Affective phenomenology
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzz035
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.

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Acts of Desire.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.

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