Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741 (2013)
AbstractIt is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories.
Similar books and articles
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Truth Without Standard Models: Some Conceptual Problems Reloaded.Eduardo Barrio & Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):122-139.
In Praise of a Logic of Definitions That Tolerates Ω‐Inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
References found in this work
From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics.William Bragg Ewald (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
The Revision Theory of Truth.Vann Mcgee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
What Theories of Truth Should Be Like (but Cannot Be).Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.