Notes on ω-inconsistent theories of truth in second-order languages

Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-01

Downloads
54 (#216,112)

6 months
3 (#210,496)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Lavinia Maria Picollo
University College London
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

Citations of this work

Truth Without Standard Models: Some Conceptual Problems Reloaded.Eduardo Barrio & Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):122-139.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
The Revision Theory of Truth.Vann Mcgee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
Notes on Naive Semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.

View all 13 references / Add more references