Philosophy of Science 66 (3):353 (1999)

Authors
Christopher Hitchcock
California Institute of Technology
Paul Bartha
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no information about the coming of Doom. More complex cases suggest a move from countably additive to non-standard probability measures
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/392736
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,214
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.
The End of the World.John Leslie - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):155-158.
A Shooting-Room View of Doomsday.William Eckhardt - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):244.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Beauty and the Bets.Christopher Hitchcock - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):405 - 420.
Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
Predictability Crisis in Early Universe Cosmology.Chris Smeenk - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (1):122-133.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Bayes' Theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayes's Theorem.E. Eells - 2008 - Gogoa 8 (1):138.
Heuristic Novelty and the Asymmetry Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Richard Nunan - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):17-36.
What Swinburne Should Have Concluded.Charles E. Gutenson - 1997 - Religious Studies 33 (3):243-247.
The Consensus Gentium Argument.Loren Meierding - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):271-297.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
269 ( #40,224 of 2,507,563 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #119,082 of 2,507,563 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes