Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable

Episteme 14 (2):197-211 (2017)

Abstract

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work

Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Debunking Arguments.Dan Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.
A Strike Against a Striking Principle.Dan Baras - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1501-1514.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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