Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable

Episteme 14 (2):197-211 (2017)
Authors
Dan Baras
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.
Keywords Benacerraf-Field challenge  moral realism  mathematical Platonism  explaining reliability  moral realism  access problem  reliability challenge
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References found in this work BETA

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.

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