Episteme 14 (2):197-211 (2017)

Authors
Dan Baras
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.
Keywords Benacerraf-Field challenge  moral realism  mathematical Platonism  explaining reliability  moral realism  access problem  reliability challenge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1017/epi.2016.5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

If There Were No Numbers, What Would You Think?Thomas Mark Eden Donaldson - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):283-287.
Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2013 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. pp. 214.
How Abstract Objects Strike Us.Michael Liston - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (1):3-27.
[Omnibus Review].Bob Hale - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):348-351.
To Bridge Gödel’s Gap.Eileen Nutting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2133-2150.
Reliability in Mathematical Physics.Michael Liston - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-21.
Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):490-510.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-03-02

Total views
409 ( #15,407 of 2,333,918 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #11,440 of 2,333,918 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes