On the cognitive status of our best physical theories

Abstract
There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories are false: In addition to its own internal problems, the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is logically incompatible with special relativity. There is also good reason to suppose that we have no concrete idea concerning what it might mean to claim that these theories are approximately or vaguely true. I will argue that providing a concrete understanding the approximate or vague truth of our current physical theories is not a task for traditional epistemology; rather, this is only possible in the context of ongoing empirical inquiry. [Note #1].
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