Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311 (2008)
The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal covariation theory is in deeper trouble over Inverted Earth than is generally supposed even by the theory's detractors.
|Keywords||inverted earth block lycan tye internalism representationalism qualia|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
Conceptual Role Semantics.Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman - 2007 - In Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 242-256.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States.Neil Campbell - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):239-256.
Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum.Justin Broackes - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.
Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the Inverted Spectrum.John V. Canfield - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):691-712.
Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):459-78.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads177 ( #25,110 of 2,158,485 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #16,255 of 2,158,485 )
How can I increase my downloads?