Abstract
Subjects were requested to choose between gambles, where the outcome of one gamble depended on a single elementary event, and the other depended on an event compounded of a series of such elementary events. The data supported the hypothesis that the subjective probability of a compound event is systematically biased in the direction of the probability of its components resulting in overestimation of conjunctive events and underestimation of disjunctive events. Studies pertaining to this topic are discussed
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DOI 10.1016/0030-5073(73)90061-5
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