Quine, synonymy and logical truth

Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):361-367 (1965)
Abstract
W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of 'synonymy' deprives us not only of "analytic statements that are obtainable from logical truths by the replacement of synonyms with synonyms" but of "logical truths" themselves
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DOI 10.1086/288060
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