Analysis 68 (2):168 - 174 (2008)

Abstract
Frank Ramsey writes: If two people are arguing ‘if p will q?’ and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. (1931) Chalmers and Hájek write: Let us take the first sentence [of Ramsey] the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘if p then q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S to accept p and consider q, S would accept q
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DOI 10.1093/analys/68.2.168
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References found in this work BETA

General Propositions and Causality.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1929 - In The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. pp. 237-255.
Ramsey + Moore = God.David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):170-172.
Why Favour Simplicity?Roger White - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):205–210.
Complexity Unfavoured.Alan Baker - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):85–88.

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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.

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