Reasoning Asymmetries Do Not Invalidate Theory-Theory

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):331-332 (2010)

Abstract
In this commentary we suggest that asymmetries in reasoning associated with moral judgment do not necessarily invalidate a theory-theory account of naïve psychological reasoning. The asymmetries may reflect a core knowledge assumption that human nature is prosocial, an assumption that heightens vigilance for antisocial dispositions, which in turn leads to differing assumptions about what is the presumed topic of conversation
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x10001688
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Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation.Craig Roxborough & Jill Cumby - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):205-213.
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.

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