Informal Logic 39 (1):70-105 (2019)

The paper tries to show that when the deepest or foundational aspects of truth are at issue, both consequentially logical argument and rhetoric that aims to establish truth or justified conviction must engage with the being, or the irreplaceable particularity, of its audience’s members and also that of the arguer, what we refer to in ordinary language as who the person is. Beyond the existing discussion of existential rhetoric, the paper argues that this engagement with being is necessary to establish not only truth that directly concerns or turns on the arguer’s and audience’s being, but also truth or justification about fundamental aspects of things and issues in general. Further, the address of being requires us to suspend both our own and our addressees’ familiar conceptual frameworks in order to allow being to emerge in its own terms. As a result, in contrast with our usual understanding of argumentation, the rhetorician’s initial aim and procedure will be to achieve a genuine suspension of conviction and even of the appropriate concepts under which to proceed, and so to produce a fundamental confusion. The paper then outlines some consequences for rhetoric and reasoning and also the structure of the process of working with this fundamental confusion.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.22329/il.v39i1.5340
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,177
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Matematica e retorica.Cesare Cozzo - 2011 - Paradigmi (3):59-72.
Logic or Rhetoric in Law?Alain Lempereur - 1991 - Argumentation 5 (3):283-297.
Rhetoric Renouncing Rhetoric.Timothy M. Asay - 2015 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 48 (2):139-161.
The Place of Logic in Reasoning.Daniel Kayser - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):225-239.
Logical Particularism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 277-299.
The Foundation in Truth of Rhetoric and Formal Logic.Jeremy Barris - 1996 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):314 - 328.


Added to PP index

Total views
4 ( #1,274,193 of 2,499,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,166 of 2,499,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes