Authors
Galen Barry
Iona College
Abstract
This paper examines Spinoza’s view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states—whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.—must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God’s nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.
Keywords contradictions   contradictions   ideas   ideas   representation   representation   self-destruction   self-destruction  Spinoza  Spinoza
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DOI 10.32881/jomp.19
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References found in this work BETA

Spinoza.Michael Della Rocca - 2008 - New York: Routlege.
Rationalism and Necessitarianism.Martin Lin - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):418-448.
Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason.Karolina Hübner - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):58-88.
The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.
Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason.Karolina Hübner - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):58-88.

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