Theory and Decision 69 (3):489-496 (2010)

Jean Baratgin
Université Paris 8 (Alumnus)
The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent -minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.
Keywords Absent-mindedness  Belief revision  Probability  Sleeping Beauty problem
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-010-9215-6
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References found in this work BETA

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
Beauty and the Bets.Christopher Hitchcock - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):405 - 420.

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Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.

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