Dorit Bar-On
University Of Connecticut, Storrs
Davidson’s well-known language skepticism—the claim that there is no such a thing as a language—has recognizably Gricean underpinnings, some of which also underlie his continuity skepticism—the claim that there can be no philosophically illuminating account of the emergence of language and thought. My first aim in this paper is to highlight aspects of the complicated relationship between central Davidsonian and Gricean ideas concerning language. After a brief review of Davidson’s two skeptical claims and their Gricean underpinnings, I provide my own take on how Davidson’s continuity skepticism can be resisted consistently with his rejection of the Gricean priority claim, yet without giving up some of Grice’s own insights regarding the origins of meaning
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2015.1115273
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning.H. Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Linguistic Behaviour.Jonathan Bennett - 1976 - Cambridge University Press.

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