Self-concern from Priestley to Hazlitt

Abstract
himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘
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DOI 10.1080/0960878032000119691
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