Oxford University Press UK (2004)

Authors
Dorit Bar-On
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.
Keywords Avowals  Epistemology  Expression  Mind  Self-knowledge
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Call number BD438.5.B37 2004
ISBN(s) 9780199263202   0199276285   0199263205   9780199276288
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Chapters BETA
Speaking My Mind: Grammar, Epistemology, and (Some) Ontology

The final chapter explains how the Neo-Expressivist account developed meets the theoretical desiderata outlined in the introduction. It then offers reflections on possible implications of the account of avowals defended in the book for certain metaphysical issues in the philosophy of mind.... see more

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Citations of this work BETA

Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
Origins of Meaning: Must We ‘Go Gricean’?Dorit Bar-on - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):342-375.
I—Knowing What You Believe.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.
Wittgenstein as a Gricean Intentionalist.Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):155-172.

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