Singuläre Propositionen und das Fassen eines Gedankens

Wolfgang Barz
Goethe University Frankfurt
This essay develops the thesis that Frege’s notion of grasping does not refer to some special psychological relation between a subject and a proposition. Instead, the verb “to grasp” is a contextually defined technical term that, taken by itself, has no meaning. If that is right, then not only Frege’s resentment to the idea of grasping singular propositions is unfounded. The view that intentionality without representations is possible, championed by some advocates of the New Theory of Reference, is groundless as well.
Keywords singular propositions  grasping a thought  intentionality  New Theory of Reference  Frege
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Belief de Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.
Thoughts on Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1990 - In Palle Yourgrau (ed.), Demonstratives. Oxford University Press. pp. 34-49.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Relationen zu Propositionen.Wolfgang Barz - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (4):512 - 529.
Arten von Propositionen.Wolfgang Barz - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):289-309.
Propositionen.Marian David - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1):37-58.
Das onto-logische Sechseck.J. W. Degen - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):113-121.
Zur Ontologie der ersten Person.Heinz-Dieter Heckmann - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):43-67.
Robert Brandom Über Singuläre Termini.Daniel Dohrn - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (3):453-465.
Die Macht des Gedankens gegenüber der Tiefe des Erlebens.Villiam Qroenbaek-Urlev - 1914 - Archive for the Psychology of Religion 5 (1):63-90.
Indexikalische Ausdrücke und Propositionen.Wolfgang Becker - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):123-153.


Added to PP index

Total views
59 ( #154,071 of 2,310,352 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #65,684 of 2,310,352 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature