Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262 (2021)

Authors
David James Barnett
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that none succeed.
Keywords self-knowledge  introspection  Moore's paradox  assertion  rational requirements  rationality
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-8809906
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