In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1 (2021)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.
|
Keywords | Epistemology Knowledge Propositional knowledge Conceptual analysis Gettier problem Lottery problem |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 34 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (1):109-134.
The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York, USA: pp. 261-271.
Czy "Epistemologia Cnót" pozwoli nam rozwiązać Problem Gettiera?Bartosz Kaluziński - 2015 - Hybris, Revista de FilosofíA (30):158-174.
Notes: A New Gettier-Type Refutation of Nozick´s Analysis of Knowledge.Jerome Gellman - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2):279-283.
50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology?Ian Michael Church - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:147-171.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2020-05-25
Total views
325 ( #32,022 of 2,506,012 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
63 ( #13,050 of 2,506,012 )
2020-05-25
Total views
325 ( #32,022 of 2,506,012 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
63 ( #13,050 of 2,506,012 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads