In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Press. pp. Chapter 1 (forthcoming)

Brian C. Barnett
State University of New York (SUNY)
According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.
Keywords Epistemology  Knowledge  Propositional knowledge  Conceptual analysis  Gettier problem  Lottery problem
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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