Authors
Jeffrey Barrett
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Abstract: C. S. Peirce's psychological analysis of belief, doubt, and inquiry provides insights into the nature of scientific knowledge. These in turn can be used to construct an account of scientific knowledge where the notions of belief, truth, rational justification, and inquiry are determined by the relationships that must hold between these notions. I will describe this account of scientific knowledge and some of the problems it faces. I will also describe the close relationship between pragmatic and naturalized accounts of scientific knowledge.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,321
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On the Evolution of Truth.Jeffrey Barrett - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1323-1332.
Philosophy of Modeling: Neglected Pages of History.Karlis Podnieks - 2018 - Baltic Journal of Modern Computing 6 (3):279–303.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Knowledge and Design.Bruce Hunter - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):309-334.
Post‐Modernism, a French Cultural Chernobyl: Foucault on Power/Knowledge.Robert Nola - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):3 – 43.
Popper and Reliabilism.Peter Lipton - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:31-43.
How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
Mary’s Scientific Knowledge.Luca Malatesti - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
42 ( #243,380 of 2,419,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #192,134 of 2,419,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes