Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):134-152 (2015)

Authors
Dorit Bar-On
University Of Connecticut, Storrs
Abstract
Contemporary discussions of self-knowledge share a presupposition to the effect that the only way to vindicate so-called first-person authority as understood by our folk-psychology is to identify specific “good-making” epistemic features that render our self-ascriptions of mental states especially knowledgeable. In earlier work, I rejected this presupposition. I proposed that we separate two questions: How is first-person authority to be explained? What renders avowals instances of a privileged kind of knowledge?In response to question, I offered a neo-expressivist account that, I argued, is compatible with a variety of non-deflationary, substantive answers to question. Here I re-evaluate the relative merits of the neo-expressivist account in light of some recent attempts to capture first-person authority by appealing to the so-called transparency of mental self-attributions. I then canvass two recent appeals to transparency that give priority to question. Bearing in mind..
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2015.1032334
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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Citations of this work BETA

Introduction: Self-Knowledge in Perspective.Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):123-133.

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