The Logical Structure of Intentional Anonymity

Diametros 16 (60):1-17 (2019)
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Abstract

It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknown-ness is insufficient. This common-sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between the intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus on the intentional aspect of anonymity and develop a metaphor of “anonymity game” between “perpetrator” and “detective”. Beginning from common-sense intuitions, we provide a formalized, critical notion of anonymity.

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Jarek Gryz
York University

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References found in this work

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