The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology

Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309 (2008)
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Abstract

In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.

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2009-01-28

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Author Profiles

Elizabeth Barnes
University of Virginia
Ross Cameron
University of Virginia

References found in this work

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Past, present and future.Arthur N. Prior - 1967 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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