Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410 (1996)

Authors
Eric Barnes
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provides stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and then confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and 'used', in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting attempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain conditions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism using Maher's analysis as a starting point. I briefly summarize Maher's primary argument and expand upon it; I explore related issues pertaining to the causal structure of empirical domains and the logic of discovery
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DOI 10.1086/289918
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism.Colin Howson & Allan Franklin - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):574-585.
Howson and Franklin on Prediction.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):329-340.
Discovery and Ampliative Inference.James Blachowicz - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):438-462.

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Citations of this work BETA

On the Predilections for Predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
Predictivism for Pluralists.Eric Christian Barnes - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Predictive Hypotheses Are Ineffectual in Resolving Complex Biochemical Systems.Michael Fry - 2018 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (2):25.
Social Predictivism.Eric Barnes - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):69 - 89.
Reliabilism 'Naturalized'.Steven Miller & Marcel Fredericks - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (4):367 – 376.

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Eric Christian Barnes: The Paradox of Predictivism. [REVIEW]David Harker - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):219-223.
Predictivism for Pluralists.Eric Christian Barnes - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism.Colin Howson & Allan Franklin - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):574-585.
On the Predilections for Predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism.Wang-Yen Lee - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):553-562.
Social Predictivism.Eric Barnes - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):69 - 89.

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