The Perspectivity of Feeling

Process Studies 38 (2):189-206 (2009)
Abstract
For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus it may turn out that the elusiveness of feeling is essential to its functionality
Keywords Major Philosophers  Philosophy and Religion  Religious Studies
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ISBN(s) 0360-6503
DOI 10.5840/process200938219
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