Erkenntnis 42 (1):89-105 (1995)

Authors
Jeffrey Barrett
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
There is a long tradition of trying to find a satisfactory interpretation of Everett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics. Albert and Loewer recently described two new ways of reading Everett: one we will call the single-mind theory and the other the many-minds theory. I will briefly describe these theories and present some of their merits and problems. Since both are no-collapse theories, a significant merit is that they can take advantage of certain properties of the linear dynamics, which Everett apparently considered to be important, to constrain their statistical laws
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DOI 10.1007/BF01666813
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References found in this work BETA

”Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics.Hugh Everett - 1957 - Reviews of Modern Physics 29 (3):454--462.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Bare Theory Has No Clothes.Jeffrey Bub, Rob Clifton & Bradley Monton - 1998 - In Richard Healey & Geoffrey Hellman (eds.), Quantum Measurement: Beyond Paradox. Minneapolis, USA: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 32-51.
Multiplicity in Everett׳s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Louis Marchildon - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):274-284.

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