Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401 (2013)

Sam Baron
Australian Catholic University
Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism
Keywords Presentism  Truthmaking  Supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/sjp.12032
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Causation.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Time and Physical Geometry.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):240-247.
A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Beneficence and Procreation.Molly Gardner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
Ostrich Presentism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
719 ( #7,020 of 2,403,876 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,989 of 2,403,876 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes