Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401 (2013)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism
|
Keywords | Presentism Truthmaking Supervenience |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/sjp.12032 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics.John Bigelow - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
View all 39 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Presentism and Temporal Experience.Akiko Frischhut - 2017 - In Ian B. Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):153-173.
Similar books and articles
Presentism and the Objection From Being-Supervenience.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.
Presentism and Grounding Past Truths.Matthew Davidson - 2013 - In Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.), New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism. Verlag. pp. 153-172.
The Truth About the Past and the Future.Ned Markosian - 2013 - In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching Time and the Open Future. Springer. pp. 127-141.
Why so Serious? Non-Serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations.Ross Inman - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):55-63.
Presentism, Truthmakers and Distributional Properties.Phil Corkum - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3427-46.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2012-11-05
Total views
719 ( #7,020 of 2,403,876 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,989 of 2,403,876 )
2012-11-05
Total views
719 ( #7,020 of 2,403,876 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,989 of 2,403,876 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads