Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401 (2013)
Authors
Sam Baron
University of Western Australia
Abstract
Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism
Keywords Presentism  Truthmaking  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1111/sjp.12032
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

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Beneficence and Procreation.Molly Gardner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
Ostrich Presentism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.

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