Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287 (2010)

Authors
Jean Baratgin
Université Paris 8 (Alumnus)
Abstract
The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), in which the universe is evolving. In that case the structure of the universe has definitely been transformed and the revision message conveys information on the resulting universe. The second part of the paper presents four experiments based on the Monty Hall puzzle that aim to show that updating is a natural frame for individuals to revise their beliefs.
Keywords Bayes' rule, focusing, probability revision, updating
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1080/13546783.2010.519564
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References found in this work BETA

Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ranking Theory.Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & Wolfgang Spohn - forthcoming - Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (Eds). The Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.

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