Uncertain reasoning about agents' beliefs and reasoning

Artificial Intelligence and Law 9 (2-3):115-152 (2001)

Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in varioussubareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason andthe beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of membersof a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjecturedbeliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider adefendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing;and so on. Further, the mental states in question may themselves beabout the mental states and processes of other people. Therefore, if AIsystems are to assist with reasoning tasks in law, they may need to beable to reason about mental states and processes. Such reasoning isriddled with uncertainty, and this is true in particular in the legaldomain. The article discusses how various different types ofuncertainty arise, and shows how they greatly complicate the task ofreasoning about mental states and processes. The article concentrates onthe special case of states of belief and processes of reasoning, andsketches an implemented, prototype computer program (ATT-Meta) thatcopes with the various types of uncertainty in reasoning about beliefsand reasoning. In particular, the article outlines the system'sfacilities for handling conflict between different lines of argument,especially when these lie within the reasoning of different people. Thesystem's approach is illustrated by application to a real-life muggingexample.
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DOI 10.1023/A:1017993913369
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Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
In Defense of the Simulation Theory.A. Goldman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.
Theories of Theories of Mind.Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):115-119.
A Deduction Model of Belief.Kurt Konolige - 1986 - Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.

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