Verdad y Circularidad

Theoria 17 (1):63-79 (2002)
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
University of Buenos Aires
Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects of Belnap and Gupta's theory that, as for as I know, had not been considered before.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548  
DOI theoria20021712
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