Warrant and Objectivity

Dissertation, Kings College London (2008)

Wright's _Truth and Objectivity_ seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. Dummett introduced 'anti-realism' as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. _Truth and Objectivity_ proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area. This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant. The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable (Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint, where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of ignorance which he calls `Quandary'. I criticise this before proposing an alternative. I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise. However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness. Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism has promise, and I endorse Wright's Cautious Man argument for non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with `direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate needs to be accommodated by the proposal.
Keywords Anti-realism  Wright  Cognitive Command  Blameless Disagreement  Epistemic Constraint  Expressivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kölbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

``Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):159-169.
More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.


Added to PP index

Total views
50 ( #162,990 of 2,259,693 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #67,668 of 2,259,693 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature