Why P rather than q? The curiosities of fact and foil

Philosophical Studies 73 (1):35 - 53 (1994)

Eric Barnes
Southern Methodist University
In this paper I develop a theory of contrastive why questions that establishes under what conditions it is sensible to ask "why p rather than q?". p and q must be outcomes of a single type of causal process.
Keywords contrastive why questions  explanation  causal explanation
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DOI 10.1007/BF00989743
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References found in this work BETA

Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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Citations of this work BETA

Inference to the Loveliest Explanation.Eric Barnes - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):251 - 277.
Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
Two Kinds of Causal Explanation.George Botterill - 2010 - Theoria 76 (4):287-313.

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