Philo 14 (2):137-160 (2011)

Some philosophers have argued that the concepts of evil and wickedness cannot be well grasped by those inclined to a naturalist bent, perhaps because evil is so intimately tied to religious discourse or because it is ultimately not possible to understand evil, period. By contrast, I argue that evil—or, at least, what it is to be an evil person—can be understood by naturalist philosophers, and I articulate an independently plausible account of evil character
Keywords evil  wickedness
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/Philo201114211
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