Theory and Decision 52 (2):139-147 (2002)

Frank Arntzenius
Oxford University
Pulier (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 291) and Machina (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 293) seek to dissolve the Barrett–Arntzenius infinite decision puzzle (1999, Theory and Decision 46: 101). The proposed dissolutions, however, are based on misunderstandings concerning how the puzzle works and the nature of supertasks more generally. We will describe the puzzle in a simplified form, address the recent misunderstandings, and describe possible morals for decision theory
Keywords Dutch book  Supertask  Puzzle
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DOI 10.1023/A:1015564123344
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References found in this work BETA

Infinite Pains: The Trouble with Supertasks.John Earman & John Norton - 1996 - In Adam Morton & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), Benacerraf and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 11--271.
Barrett and Arntzenius's Infinite Decision Puzzle.Mark J. Machina - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):291-295.
A Flawed Infinite Decision Puzzle.Myron L. Pulier - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):289-290.

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Citations of this work BETA

Supertasks.Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Pragmatic Arguments Show Too Much?Martin Peterson - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):165-172.
Infinite Exchange Problems.Michael Scott & Alexander Scott - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (4):397-406.

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