Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho
Federal University of Minas Gerais
In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim that pragmatically presupposing salience is a fundamental aspect of using demonstratives. Secondly, we hold that the pragmatics of demonstrating can only be properly understood in relation to meta-pragmatic conditions that have to do with joint attention. We use tests of truth-value gap as evidence for our claim. Our proposal provides us with a complete view of what speakers do and presuppose when engaging in acts of demonstrative reference through language.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.15448/1984-6746.2020.3.38525
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Studies Toward a Theory of Indexical Reference.William Walter Taschek - 1983 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer.J. P. Smit - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):43-66.
Complex Demonstratives and Their Singular Contents.David Braun - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (1):57-99.
Bare-Boned Demonstratives.Stefano Predelli - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.
Demonstratives Without Rigidity or Ambiguity.Ethan Nowak - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (5):409-436.
Demonstrative Reference: It’s Not What You Think.Robert Seltzer - 2005 - Florida Philosophical Review 5 (1):45-59.
Reference, Perception, and Attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics.Lynsey Wolter - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
The Presidential Address: Where Demonstratives Meet Vagueness: Possible Languages.Adam Morton - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):1 - 18.


Added to PP index

Total views
45 ( #242,467 of 2,462,287 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #78,547 of 2,462,287 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes