In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118 (2021)
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Abstract |
In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic wronging. Though conceptually distinct, the two doctrines overlap in important ways. This paper provides clarification on the relationship between the two, providing reasons throughout that we should accept both.
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Keywords | Moral encroachment Doxastic wronging Ethics of belief Justification Right to privacy Relevant alternatives Purism |
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-16.
Ethics and Imagination.Joy Shim & Shen-yi Liao - forthcoming - In James Harold (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Art. Oxford University Press.
What Should Relational Egalitarians Believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
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