Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17 (2018)
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Abstract |
We care what people think of us. The thesis that beliefs wrong, although compelling, can sound ridiculous. The norms that properly govern belief are plausibly epistemic norms such as truth, accuracy, and evidence. Moral and prudential norms seem to play no role in settling the question of whether to believe p, and they are irrelevant to answering the question of what you should believe. This leaves us with the question: can we wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about each other? Can beliefs wrong? In this introduction, I present a brief summary of the articles that make up this special issue. The aim is to direct readers to open avenues for future research by highlighting questions and challenges that are far from being settled. These papers shouldn’t be taken as the last word on the subject. Rather, they mark the beginning of a serious exploration into a set of questions that concern the morality of belief, i.e., doxastic morality.
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Keywords | Ethics of belief Epistemology Doxastic morality |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0276-2080 |
DOI | 10.5840/philtopics20184611 |
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
What Do We Epistemically Owe to Each Other? A Reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.
Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.
View all 19 citations / Add more citations
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2018-06-09
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88 ( #8,256 of 2,497,775 )
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